甄健華 Zhen Jianhua
2014年9月17日 September 19, 2014
香港民主獨立Hong Kong Democracy and Independence
香港大學學生會學苑（Undergrad）2014年9月
Undergrad, published by the Student Union of University of Hong Kong, September 2014
既然中國已明確拒絕給予香港真普選、完全背棄對一國兩制政策的承諾，如今香港民族不但已淪為中國的奴隸並且面臨滅族，只有一場徹底的本地抗中革命，方可自救。民族自決（self-determination of peoples）乃天經地義；香港和平抗爭已走到絕路，以武抗暴就是唯一選擇。香港人面對暴政，態度必須強硬，因為怯懦只會招致滅亡，永不超生。要不就負隅一戰，奮起革命，要不就屈從一統，淪為中國的奴隸。因此，為了獨立建國，香港人唯有發動武裝起義。上述正是香港人武裝起義追求獨立建國的正當性（legitimacy）和合法性（legality）。 Since China definitely declines to give real democracy to Hong Kong as promised in her “One Country, Two Systems” policy toward Hong Kong, Hong Kong people nowadays not only end up being enslaved under Chinese chauvinism but are also at risk of racial extinction. We Hongkongers can become the masters of our fate only through a revolution against China. The self-determination of peoples is a matter of course; hence, as peaceful protests proved fruitless, an armed revolution would be the only option. At this crucial moment in the political future of Hong Kong, we Hongkongers are to revolt or face destruction, because we have nowhere to turn - either we fight the war and start a revolution, or we succumb ourselves and be enslaved to the Beijing regime. These tell the legitimacy and legality of founding the Republic of Hong Kong through an armed revolution.
港獨不單意味失去中國庇蔭，成為國際孤軍，更象徵中港主權割裂，觸動中國神經。即使能夠解決香港本土資源供應的問題，但實際上，港獨運動本質是一場分離主義革命，面對中國獨裁政體，以中國保守的地緣取態，可以預見港獨以後必然出現流血衝突。姑莫論革命動機正當與否，如何實踐獨立乃港獨派無可迴避的問題。觀歷史上的獨立運動，獨立之法不外乎有三： Independence of Hong Kong from China means Hong Kong loses the military protection otherwise provided by the Chinese PLA troops, orphaning Hong Kong in the international front, and it also symbolises the separation of China's sovereignty over Hong Kong--a subject of great sensitivity to China. Even if we Hongkongers can resolve the problem of local supplies, but practically a Hong Kong independence movement is a separatist revolution. Let's not forget that we are facing an autocratic regime; and it is a no-brainer to expect violent confrontation given Beijing's conservative attitude. Putting the motive of revolution aside, how to set independence in motion is an unavoidable conundrum that proponents of Hong Kong independence have to face. Historically, the way of carrying out an independence movement boils down to one of three events:
武裝獨立armed independence;
境外勢力扶植獨立，以及independence fostered by "foreign forces"; and
政治協商式獨立independence with political negotiation.
如今中共勢大，野心不淺，且香港於中國有利，協商難成。既然政治談判無望，餘下兩路港獨之法又可行與否？ With the Chinese Communist Party in power and hungry with ambitions who sees Hong Kong as a means of bringing benefits unto itself, it is near impossible for Hong Kong to negotiate for its independence fairly and squarely. With one way down, are the other two ways viable options for Hong Kong?
港獨的境內戰力 INTERNAL ARMED FORCES OF HONG KONG INDEPENDENCE
所謂武裝獨立，是指地區戰力通過與主權國進行武力鬥爭，以達至獨立自治，因此武裝獨立的先決條件，乃地區能擁有自主戰力。循武力達至港獨，代價不菲，但因此而抹殺討論有欠公允。An armed independence movement aims to achieve independence and autonomy by confronting the sovereign state with armed forces. Hence, the prerequisite of an armed Hong Kong independence movement is local armed forces. The price of independence by blunt force is no doubt astronomical, but here we will still present the arguments for the sake of discussion.
分析武裝港獨，大概可研究組織境內戰力對抗境外戰力的可行性。一支本土武裝力量的組成，必須依賴兵力與武備。論前者，香港縱有七百萬人口，但以全民皆兵式估算本土的武裝戰力容量乃為不智，因此舉意味所有經濟活動的停頓，且於實踐上不可行；論後者，香港非軍事區，僅有武備只得駐港中國匪軍與警隊武器庫存，也缺乏海、空兩軍的支援實力，故組織陸地部隊將是香港唯一可行的武裝獨立路線。We can study the feasibility of mobilising internal forces against external forces. Armed forces must rely on number and armaments. For army, despite having a population of seven million, Hong Kong cannot count all of them as all social and economic activities that sustain Hong Kong will cease. For armament, as Hong Kong is not a military region, the only form of weaponry is within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Garrison and the Police Forces. Any form of navy or air forces requires far greater resources, so the only possible armed independence for Hong Kong would be setting up an infantry regiment.
有關本土陸地部隊的組成方式，大可參照新加坡的軍民比例。現時新加坡實行徵兵制，其徵兵對象乃全國近190萬的非外國籍男性公民，適齡國民均須服役兩年。 As to the formation of a local army, we can take reference from Singapore's National Service (NS), the compulsory enlistment system in the nation. All of the 1.9 million male Singaporean citizens not holding a foreign nationality and who have attained the military age are required by law to be enlisted for two years.
新加坡武裝部隊分別由正規軍、現役軍以及後備軍組成，當中正規軍有3.18萬，現役軍3.98萬，後備軍95萬，數量分別相當於該地男性國民人口的1.8％、2.2％以及52.7％。 Singapore is currently protected by armed forces composed of 31,800 regular servicemen, 39,800 active personnel and over 950,000 reserve personnel, which correspond to 1.8%, 2.2% and 52.7% of the male population, respectively.
假如香港擁有相同比例的全職軍人，以目前香港18歲以上268萬名適齡健全男性計算，可有正規軍5萬。如按照當地的服役年齡16至24歲計算，3.98萬現役軍實際只是當地上述年齡組別的15％，以香港合符服役年齡男性44萬人口計算，每年可以徵集最少6.6萬現役軍。行之十年，全港將擁有最少70萬的後備動員力。With about 2,680,000 physically-fit male over the age of 18 in Hong Kong, it is possible that we can have a local army of 50,000 regular soldiers, assuming a similar conscription proportion. If Hong Kong is to adopt the Singapore military age between 16 and 24, the number rises to 66,000 regular servicemen each year. After a decade, at least 700,000 personnel would be available as reserve army.
至於開支，新加坡現時軍費每年99億美元，佔其GDP3.6％，如按照同樣比例的軍費支出，根據香港2012年2633億美元GDP計算，將每年需要94.7億美元以維持本土戰力。以2012至13年度財政總開支3,937億港元為例，上述軍費實際上佔總數的18.6%。As for expenditure, military expenses of Singaporean government total around USD9.9 billion every year, taking up 3.6% of its GDP. According to the same percentage, with our GDP in 2012 at USD263.3 billion, a sum of USD9.47 billion would be needed to sustain our armed forces, which would make up around 18.6% of the total expenditure in the 2012-2013 fiscal year (HKD393.7 billion).
不過，即使港獨派能夠組織本土戰力，來自主權國的軍事壓力依然存在。所謂知己知彼，既已知己，亦當知彼。目前香港境內有一支六千人的駐港中國匪軍部隊，乃中國政府派駐本地負責防務的武裝力量，由三軍組成，散佈全港，於必要時應對香港安全問題。Having said that, even if proponents of HK independence can mobilise local armed forces, military pressure from China still exists. As the ancient Chinese military treatise The Art of War posits, "Precise knowledge of self and precise knowledge of the threat leads to victory". We have a garrison of 6,000-strong PLA stationed in Hong Kong. They are responsible to Beijing for the defense of Hong Kong. With army, navy and air forces spreading around HK, the PLA will be tackling the safety issue if necessary.
故當港獨革命啟動，港獨派面對的首批阻力必然是境內駐紮的中國匪軍部隊。又因香港毗鄰澳門，駐澳中國匪軍戰力亦有千人，港獨部隊實際面對的是七千人眾的反動力量，其抗爭過程必然血腥。If a Hong Kong independence-oriented revolution happens, the first obstacle will be the Hong Kong PLA Garrison. As Hong Kong is next to Macau, there is a 1,000-strong Macau PLA Garrison. We have to face 7,000 PLAs, which means violent and blood scenes will be unavoidable if confrontation has to take place.
又假如港獨部隊戰力能於境內抗爭中取得短暫勝利，成功收斂兩地駐軍武備物資，港獨隊伍仍須面對北方軍事壓境。And if Hong Kong revolutionary forces could achieve temporary victory in Hong Kong and get the armament and materials of HK and Macau, Hong Kong independence movement supporters still have to face the Chinese army across the Hongkong-China border.
目前中國有七大軍區，分掌各地軍務，香港則下豁廣州軍區。此軍區主管兩廣、兩湖、海南五省，其戰時使命為保衛南部，必要時增援港澳。There are seven military regions in China, and Hong Kong is under Guangzhou Military Region, which looks over Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Hubei and Hainan. Its mission is to protect the south, and provide support to HK and Macau Garrison.
港獨革命啟動，駐港駐澳軍隊被逐，廣州軍區必有反應。現時此區陸軍戰力主要駐紮兩廣，握第41、42乙級集團軍。前者擁一師五旅四團，後者掌一師九旅四團，合計至少13萬的常備戰力，當中包括步兵、炮兵、坦克、防空、機步的部隊組合。When a Hong Kong independence-oriented revolution took place, and the Garrisons were evicted, the Guangzhou Garrison will be alert immediately. It mainly stations in Guangdong and Guangxi, with the 41st and 42nd Group Army. 41st has one division, five battalions and four regiments, 42nd has one division, nine divisions and four regiments, and there are 130,000 army in two Group Armies, with army, infantry, tank, armoured, artillery and so on.
反觀港獨部隊只能從駐軍、警隊取得有限武備，姑且排除廣州軍區陸軍以外、13萬以上的海空力量，面對武備懸殊，北方軍事壓邊，香港仍然無法自處。應對之法或曰遊擊戰略，惟如此一來，香港全境形同戰區，國計民生將難以維持，結果同樣悲慘，最終中國武力佔領香港，港獨自治徹底摧毀。But on the other hand, the Hong Kong independence troops could only obtain limited armaments from the PLA Garrison and the Police Forces, and more than 130,000 navy and air forces excluding the army in Guangzhou Military Region. Facing such a large difference in armament with the strong military power across the river, Hong Kong cannot avoid being attacked. We might use "guerrilla tactics", but yet that turns the territory into a war zone, where daily lives could not be sustained anymore. The result would be equally pathetic, eventually the Chinese troops will occupy Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong independence movement will be completely destroyed.
港獨的境外盟友 EXTERNAL ARMED FORCES OF HONG KONG INDEPENDENCE
既然武裝港獨難行，尋求境外勢力支持獨立又如何？相對於武裝鬥爭的地區戰線而言，作為香港獨立建國法則之二的境外勢力扶植，它能賦予香港更大的獨立籌碼。If armed independence of Hong Kong is not an easy approach, what about seeking support from external forces? Comparing to armed independence, seeking support from external forces enables more independence-related bargaining power for Hong Kong.
以香港目前的客觀條件，雖有獨立基礎，惟欠獨立契機與力量，因此成功援引境外勢力介入，不單意味港獨革命再非孤軍作戰，也是地區戰爭升級成為國際對奕的象徵。當今香港，如要借助外力達至港獨，其策略伙伴一為中國獨立勢力，二為海外大國勢力。For Hong Kong, we have the foundation for independence, but the catalytic element and power are not mature yet. If it is possible to seek intervention from external forces, it means the Hong Kong independence revolution is not alone anymore, and will become a symbol of upward spiral from a regional war to an international scheme. If Hong Kong has to gain independence from China, there are two streams of forces: independence forces in China and the Great Powers overseas.
現時涉及中國的民族獨立運動，除港獨以外，尚有藏獨、疆獨、台獨三者。 In addition to the Hong Kong Independence Movement, independence movements around China include Tibet Independence Movement, Xinjiang (preferably East Turkistan) Independence Movement [hereinafter Xinjiang Independence Movement], and Taiwan Independence Movement.
三地獨立運動源遠流長，前兩者民族自決意味較濃，惟台獨的原因傾向意識形態矛盾。暫不提台獨勢力，目前中國政府以消弭文化作為民族政策之旨，昔日五族共和無以為繼，西藏、新疆兩地早生怒憤，義起抗爭。縱三地背景相異，但目標一致，理論上港獨派能取得其支持。假如香港聯同兩地組成獨立聯盟，結果不離二況： The three independence movements have a long history. The first two have stronger intention to have self-determination; while the latter one is due to conflicts in ideology. Putting Taiwan-Independence aside, the maxim of ethnic policy in China is to eliminate various cultures. The Five Races Under One Union policy no longer exist, causing Tibet and Xinjiang in a rage, thus standing out and confront Beijing. Although the backgrounds of the three independence movements are different, their goals are the same, and they can lend support to Hong Kong separatists theoretically. When Hong Kong and the other two regions become allies, there will be two possible results:
良況之下，獨立思潮遍地開花，佈及南、北、西三域，中國陷入領土分裂危機，港獨派乘亂而上，自制獨立，且三地獨立成功，聯盟更可發展成為邦聯制度，實行三國建交，圍堵中國，反過來掐華咽喉，兌換政治本錢。然而，在地緣位置上，前兩者與香港相去甚遠，動亂之際或會難以支援，且礙於聲氣不通，消息不傳，港獨革命啟動之時，未必能取得兩地和應而迅速遭到鎮壓。A better one: the sparks of independence movements spread over the south, the north and the west; China will be separated. Hong Kong Independence Movement supporters will take such advantage and claim independence. When three places became independent, the alliance could turn into a confederate system, with diplomacy and containment to China. Yet in terms of territory, Tibet and Xinjiang are too far from Hong Kong, and it would be hard to support each other. Moreover, the flow of information might be obstructed, and the Hong Kong independence-oriented revolution might be suppressed quickly without getting support from Tibet and Xinjiang.
而即使面對獨立革命四起，接近三成土地（西藏、新疆、香港）遭分離主義者瓜分，亦不見得中國必會措手不及，反倒可能狠下殺心，以軍事武力捍衛地區治權，結果或會誘使中國進一步獨裁執政，收緊治權，此為惡況。A worse one: When Beijing knows nearly 30% of its territory are separated, Beijing might suppress these independence movements mercilessly with its own troops, the result would be far less autonomy and more dictatorship.
再談港台聯盟。於上述提到的四區獨立運動之中，最有條件宣告獨立的乃是台灣。台灣本為國民黨餘部領地，當年國共內戰敗陣中原，自此退守弧島，以海峽相隔。縱然台獨聲音依然不絕，但實際上，如今台灣擁有完整自主權、獨立政治制度，又掌握武裝力量、與國際建交，已儼如一個獨立政體。台灣獨派口喊獨立，只為國際正名，實質無差，台獨其實早被暗自承認。As to the alliance between Hong Kong and Taiwan. Among the four regions, Taiwan is most mature to the step of independence. Taiwan became the territory of Kuomintang (KMT), as in the late 1940s, KMT lose lots of battles in China and retreated to Taiwan with a strait in between. Although there are a lot of people supporting Taiwan Independence Movement, but in fact, Taiwan has its own autonomy, political system, military forces, diplomacy (though limited) - it is a de facto independent political entity. The Taiwan Independence Movement supporters are just waiting for recognition in the world.
台中得以共處，皆因兩地政經上的曖昧關係，但若然台灣聲言保港，與放棄目前政治上的含糊取態、赤裸裸對華宣戰的舉動無異。近年來，台灣國民黨政權取態親華，淪為台灣政治常態，站於台灣立場，目前襄助港獨決不可取 － 至少不可能在馬英九執政期內發生。The co-existence of Taiwan and China is due to the shady relationship in the politic and economic field. But if Taiwan supports Hong Kong, it is no different than declaring war to China. In recent years, the KMT-ruled Taiwan has been standing closer to China. It is not beneficial for Taiwan to support Hong Kong now - at least not in Ma Ying-jeou's tenure.
港獨既然難與三地獨立運動配合，那依附其他地區獨立的可行性又如何？以中國現況而言，新獨立運動缺乏誘因成型，但造成社會不穩的隱憂還是不少。近來中國收緊南方語言政策，肆意打壓地區文化，早年更因試圖推普廢粵，引發撐粵語運動，激起粵人反抗。While it is difficult for Hong Kong separatists to collaborate with their aforesaid counterparts, how about with separatists based in other regions? For the current China, the incentive of new independence movement is still not in place, but there are still a lot of problem causing social instability. In recent years, Beijing tries to pull the reins in on the policy of southern languages/dialects, and to suppress regional culture. Few years ago, they tried to replace the broadcasting language of Guangzhou (Canton) TV with Putonghua, instead of the commonly-used language in the province, Cantonese. This caused a lot of protective reactions from Cantonese people.
縱然撐粵語運動未得到廣泛支持，卻顯示廣東民眾與中國政府漸生矛盾，日後因而爆發內戰亦非完全危言聳聽。蓋兩廣與香港文化同出一轍，領土又毗鄰兩廣，嶺南一體或是港獨一法。 Although the pro-Cantonese movement is limited, it shows that the conflicts between Cantonese and Beijing regime are looming large, and it is not impossible to have a civil war. Since Cantonese is the mother tongue among locals of Guangdong and Guangxi which are adjacent to Hong Kong, the locals’ loyalty to Cantonese is quite likely to evolve into a "Lingnan" independence movement.
中國歷史上，南方多是革命溫床。兩廣獨立，並非天方夜譚。早於清末義和團亂事之際，革命派曾經游說時任兩廣總督的李鴻章合作，成立兩廣共和國，只是後來情勢有變，廣獨之事遂成空談。The south has been the revolution hotbed in the Chinese history. It is not a day-dream for Guangdong and Guangxi ["Two Guangs"] to be independent. During the Boxers' Rebellion, the revolutionaries once lobbied Li Hung-chang, the then famous diplomat and Governor of Two Guangs, for establishing a "Two Guangs" Republic. But the situation changed then, so it was put at the back burner.
兩廣位處嶺南，嶺南地勢複雜，以山地、丘陵為主，廣西山地環繞，廣東北高南低，尚算有險可守。兩廣之地，本為漢時南越國境，乃控據南方軍事形勢的要地，兵家必爭。Two Guangs is at the south of Qinling [That's why it is called Lingnan], a region with rugged terrain. Guangxi is surrounded by mountains, and Guangdong is mountainous at its north, flatland at its south, therefore not so easy to tackle with. Two Guangs were originally the country of Nanyue/Nam Yuet back in the Han dynasty, and was a hotly contested area.
香港如今無險可守，無糧可依，假如重推廣獨計劃，其幅員逾40萬平方里，兩廣將可屏障我城，供應資源。又以兩廣境內1.5億人口計，若參照新加坡軍民比例，可有正規軍至少135萬，連同港獨戰力，兩廣共和國合計可擁有至少140萬全職軍人，此數量已經超過中國匪軍總量一半。然而，目前兩廣外省人口佔大多數，其具體戰力仍是未能定數。 Now Hong Kong has no geographical barriers, nor we have foods to rely upon. If we reconsider the Two-Guangs independence movement, with its area of over 400,000 km2, it can become a barrier in protecting Hong Kong and providing supplies thereto. If we refer to Singapore, from the estimates of 150 million residents in Two Guangs, then we can have at least 1.35 million of regular soldiers, and with the Hong Kong independence armed forces in Hong Kong, then 1.4 million of regular soldiers in total can be gathered - that is a figure higher than half of the PLA amount. Yet lots of the population in Two Guangs are from other provinces, so it is still uncertain to tell the strength of such independence-oriented armed forces.
實踐此法，一則下而上，一則上而下。前者難以聚眾，且兩廣下豁廣州軍區，而陸軍主力駐紮兩廣，下而上革命只會被迅速撲滅；至於後者實際上是軍變。近年習近平借反貪腐行動打擊敵對黨派，四植親信，其中廣州軍區參謀長徐粉林被躍為司令員，並於八一建軍節前被晉升上將，同區政治委員魏亮亦被陞為上將。中國軍區實行雙首長制，司令員掌軍，政治委員為黨代表，以起制衡之效。We have two methods in applying this: bottom-up or top-down. Bottom-up one cannot really gather people, and Two Guangs include the Guangzhou Military Region, where the main force is the army. Such method will cause a prompt failure; top-down one will be a coup d'etat. In recent years, Xi Jinping combated many opposing factions in the excuse of anti-corruption, and put many of his nepots everywhere. Xu Fenlin (Guangzhou MR Chief of Staff) was quickly promoted as a commander and a general, and the political commissar Wei Liang was unconventionally promoted as a General too. Dual chief system is adopted in military regions of China, the commander controls the army, and the political commissar is the representative of the party, so as to "check and balance".
兩者不和，區內必生憂患。徐粉林屢居要職，實至名歸，但魏亮實為破格晉升，估計是習總有意為之。二人雖為習派，惟徐粉林或因資歷之故，有恃無恐，埋下軍政不和根源。輕則內鬥，重則內亂，最終或誘使徐粉林擁兵自立，成為兩廣獨立先聲。不過，即使屆時軍閥割據，兩廣乘亂自立，也不見新政權必會優待香港，允許自治，廣獨之事或會反過來困堵本地自治運動的發展，結果得不償失。If two sides are not harmonious, there will be problems in their regions. Xu had his proven record to sit important positions, but the unconventional promotion of Wei Liang might be one of the scheme of Xi Jinping. Both Xu and Wei are pro-Xi, but Xu sowed the seed of discord as he felt nothing to fear due to his qualifications. There might be internal struggles or even riots, and Xu might gain his own troops and become a pioneer in the Two-Guangs independence movement. But at the time warlords might not treat Hong Kong well and allow autonomy of Hong Kong as Two-Guangs will be in a mess. The Two-Guangs independence movement might in turn trap the development of local autonomous campaign as the losses outweighed the gains.
內求不得，外求如何？自九七中國併吞香港以來，本土便有歸英派。與獨立派主張不同，此派提倡回歸英國，甚至重返殖民地時代。姑且退一步討論，沒有歸英，只談自治，英國會否施壓中國，襄助香港？歸英思潮的源起，無疑衍生於恐共情緒，且與英殖背景不無關係。China is not a source, then what about "external power"? Since 1997, there are "Return-to-Britain's-rule" supporters, who supported returning into the rule of Britain, or even become a colony again. Stepping back: if there are no "return-to-Britain's-Rule" supporters, and we only focus on autonomy - will Britain add pressure to China and help Hong Kong? The return thing has to do with the communist phobia, which is intertwined with the background as a British colony.
上世紀英國堪稱日不落帝國，殖民地遍佈全球，稱霸一時。不過，今日英國已非昔日之雄，經濟問題架床疊屋，外交處境舉步維艱。伊拉克與阿富汗戰爭中，英國刻意與美國步調一致，意圖掌握更多話語權，有意成為美國附庸。In the last century, Britain was once called as "the empire on which the sun never sets", as she has colonies in many time zones. But now the military strength of the UK is not comparable to the past, along with economic and diplomatic plights. In Afghanistan and Iraq War, the UK has toed the line with the US, and wants to be allies of the US.
隨中印兩大經濟體崛起，以及美國轉而尋求新合作伙伴，均意味英國地位將日益削弱。面對如此形勢，英國因循保守，外交圓滑，不可能高調支持港獨。When two of the biggest economies in the world - China and India - rise, and the US wants to find new partners, then the status of the UK will be faltered. So the UK will be conservative diplomatically, and it will be hard to foresee its support to the Hong Kong Independence Movement.
縱然《聯合聲明》中談及中港治權分界，惟英國並無實質責任予以追究，早前宣布調查《聲明》的實踐，亦不過花瓶工作，自往面上貼金，好讓英國能有一較具體面的下台階罷了。Although the Sino-British Joint Declaration (SBJD) mentioned the delineation of rights between China and Hong Kong, the UK does not have the actual responsibility to pursue upon. A while ago the British Parliament wanted to investigate on the practice of SBJD. It was but an act to allow the UK to be less embarrassing.
英國不得，美國如何？蓋日本乃美國戰後扶植的亞洲爪牙，又為軍事同盟，加之華府一向著意重返亞太，姑且就將美日混作一談。於亞太形勢看來，日本乃中美博奕之地。Will the US support us if the UK does not? We can treat Japan the same as the US given that Japan has been the cat's paw of the US in the Asian side after WWII and is still an ally of the US. After all, Washington is eager to return to Asia-Pacific region, and Japan will be the chessboard of China and the US.
就近年南海衝突一事，華府忽然放棄中立，表態支援日本，似乎反映美國銳意削弱中國於地區的影響力。不過中國的反應卻也是咄咄逼人，強硬不讓。於是中美間就呈現了一種常態化對抗，促使關係僵硬。此情勢下，要不退讓，要不強硬。Regarding the conflict in South China Sea, the US has showed their support to Japan after their long term neutrality, and thus is said to aim at reducing China's sphere of influence. Meanwhile, Beijing has also taken a firm stance against it. Therefore it forms a constant antagonism between China and the US. Under such circumstance, the move is either to compromise or to take an unyielding stance.
若前者，中美迴避正面衝突，意味美國不可能公開支援港獨，至少不可能為香港而開罪中國。觀中美過往形勢，即使第一次台海危機(1954–1955)美國高調介入，中美軍機中國境內相撞，又或者美軍“誤”炸中國駐南斯拉夫大使館，均未有觸發兩國戰事，可見兩國一直鬥而不破，加之今日美國尚要兼顧烏克蘭、伊拉克，以及國內政經問題，無閑分身插入亞太，可預見亞太對奕未必足以成為導火線。Choosing the former one over the latter one means direct confrontation can be avoided. Yet it also represents the US, dodging the issues that might have caused offence to China, is not going to openly support the Hong Kong Independence Movement. In retrospect, the States intervened in the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–1955) in a high-profiled manner; a mid-air collision between both sides' frighter aircrafts; the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia; all these have never triggered a war between the two countries. The tension of the two has existed for long. Now that the States has stepped into the issues of Ukraine, Iraq and their own political and economic situation, it is far too busy to ever participate in Asian matters. The political standoff against Asia may not turn to the fuse of wars.
若後者，持續強硬或會誘發戰事，假若果真爆發中日戰爭，美國參戰，戰爭之世，民心易亂，港獨或可乘時而起，而美日為擴大勝算，或會扶植香港獨立建國。 But if the tension continues, a high possibility of wars outbreak is predicted. If such Sino-Japanese war does happen with the States engaging in, the Hong Kong Independence Movement may arise among the chaos of wars given the instability of people's wills. To win the war, the States and Japan may assist Hong Kong in gaining independence from China.
然而，一個美日扶植的香港國卻有機會淪為傀儡政權，港獨原意亦難實現，且借內戰獨立，政局安穩成疑，更甚者，戰亂將摧毀國計民生，港股市場一夜崩潰，所有自主資源、經濟協作的估算也再難下判斷。 However, the US-and-Japan-aided Republic of Hong Kong will probably be reduced to a puppet regime, and in consequence the intended self-determination of Hong Kong people will be unlikely to come true. Also, the stability of a regime rising from a civil war is doubtful. Worse still, the Hong Kong stock market will be ruined overnight and all the autonomy resources and the estimation of economic cooperation will be hard to assume.
但是，美日兩國乃民主大國，長期而言，美日絕對會停止操控親美日的香港共和國以免減損美日捍衛民主之聲譽。因此，一個自由民主的香港共和國肯定會逐漸成型。Nonetheless, with the US and Japan being democratic powers, they shall eventually stop controlling the Republic of Hong Kong for fear of ruining their reputation in fighting for democracy. Therefore, a free democratic Republic of Hong Kong will come into being for certain.
港獨意識崛起，絕非一日之事，它顯然是繼承八十年代以來的恐共情緒、千禧年後冒起的本土意識而蘊釀出來的。相對其他地區的獨立主張，港獨更傾向是一種流於情緒化與口號化的政治吶喊，其可行性、實踐論述卻罕有探討。故撰此陋文，以為探索港獨論述的空白領域，意在牽動討論，啟發後人思考。The ideology of Hong Kong’s independence from China has been originated and bred by the communism phobia sentiment in the 80s and the localism ideology since the 2000s. Compared to other independence advocacy in other regions, the one in Hong Kong seems to be a political shout-out that is limited to emotional and sloganised acts. The feasibility and implementation have rarely been touched. And this is the need for existence of this article. I hope at least it can promote some further discussion on this matter.